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Abstract: This paper is motivated by a distinctive appreciation of the difficulties posed by quantitative
observational inquiry into complex social and economic systems. It develops ordinary and piecewise
indices of joint and incremental informational association that enable robust approaches to a common
problem in social inquiry: grappling with associations between a quantity of interest and two distinct
sets of co-variates taking values over large numbers of individuals. The distinct analytical usefulness
of these indices is illustrated with their application to inquiry into the systemic economic effects of
patterns of discrimination by social identity in the U.S. economy.
Keywords: information theory; complex socio-economic systems; mathematical economics;
mathematical sociology

1. Introduction
This paper draws on information theory and political economy to make a methodological and
instrumental contribution to observational inquiry into the functioning of economic and broader social
systems. It is most broadly motivated by a recognition of the those systems are complex. Complexity
creates formidable and largely ignored conceptual and practical difficulties for analyses grounded on
the strong form of individualist reductionism dominating current economic thought and informing
most quantitative observational work in economics.
The paper discusses how a wide and plural range of contributions to economic thought have
effectively advanced an alternative methodological foundation for economic analysis. This alternative
is based on the recognition that the observable empirical regularities upon which we may ground our
understanding of the functioning of economic systems are generally systemic and independent of
much of the fine-grained detail of individual behavior, knowledge, and interactions. The paper
looks to information theory to develop observational tools enabling characterizations of those
systemic regularities and of the reduced-form associations they define between observable individual
characteristics. The concepts of entropy and mutual information offer very general, non-parametric,
informational measures of those associations: How much of our ignorance or lack of knowledge about
individual values of a given variable is removed once we observe individual values of other variables.
They offer innovative bases for observational inquiry into complex economic systems.
The paper derives a series of ordinary and piece-wise indices of informational association that
enable robust observational approaches to a common problem in inquiry into complex economic and
social systems: grappling with the systemic associations between a variable of interest X0 and a set of
generally interdependent covariates Xk that may be meaningfully decomposed into two distinct and
exhaustive subsets Xi and Xe , taking values over large numbers of individuals. Those indices make it
possible to develop non-parametric measures of the extent to which a set Xk informationally accounts
for a quantity X0 ; the informational synergies and redundancies between Xi and Xe in those accounts;
Entropy 2019, 21, 367; doi:10.3390/e21040367

www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy

Entropy 2019, 21, 367

2 of 20

and of the extent to which a subset Xi has an informational association with X0 independently of the
quantities in Xe (and vice versa). They can thus guide observational inquiry and provide observational
foundations for systemic theorizations of the functioning of economic systems.
To illustrate the distinctive usefulness of the indices it develops, the paper briefly reports on their
recent application to analysis of the observable economic effects of patterns of discrimination by social
identity on distributions of individual income in the U.S. economy [1]. This application is shown
to improve on extant statistical tests for the presence of economic effects of discrimination; elicits
a discussion on how the indices the paper develops relate and contribute to the use of entropy-based
measures of income inequality [2]; and results in innovative instruments and diagnostics for the
presence of “equality of opportunity,” as understood by political and economic philosophers [3–6].
Finally, it also yields distinctive insights into the manner in which observed distributions of income in
the U.S. embody forms of discrimination, and into the iniquitous manner in which levels of educational
attainment influence incomes across different social-identity groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two offers the central methodological discussion
motivating and informing the paper. Section three explains the content and usefulness to analysis of
complex economic systems of the concepts of entropy and mutual information. Sections four and five
formally develop the ordinary and piecewise indices of joint, incremental, and mutual information
advanced by the paper. Section six contains the illustrative application of these indices to analysis of
the effects of social identity on individual incomes. A brief concluding section closes the discussion.
2. Individuals, Complexity, and Observable Outcomes
Information-theoretic measures can offer robust, non-parametric characterizations of
reduced-form, systemic associations between observable quantities generated by decentralized,
market economies. Those characterizations are useful to inquiry into complex relationships and
effects that generally defy analysis based on the strong individualist reductionism that dominates
contemporary economic thought. They require no detailed descriptions of agent characteristics,
specific market equilibria, or particular mechanisms. However, understanding the results they yield
requires a distinctive, social understanding of the interplay between individual agencies and systemic
interdependencies in conditioning observable economic outcomes, including the emergence of systemic
regularities that may inform the development of theory. This requires stepping back from the accepted
methodological approach informing much of today’s economic analysis.
2.1. Neoclassical Individualist Reductionism
Contemporary economics has settled on a rather strong form of individualist reductionism.
The substance and disciplinary dominance of this methodological stance was summarized well by
leading neoclassical theorist Kenneth Arrow,
“It is a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in terms of the
actions and reactions of individuals. Our behavior in judging economic research, in peer
review of papers and research, and in promotions, includes the criterion that in principle
the behavior we explain and the policies we propose are explicable in terms of individuals,
not of other social categories [7].”
In line with this proposition, contemporary economics has sought to characterize the functioning
of economic systems on the basis of detailed descriptions of the behavior of “representative”
individuals, or of similarly detailed game-theoretic representations of interactions between small
numbers of agent types. In canonical microeconomic and macroeconomic frameworks, this includes
specifications of subjective consumption preferences; technological constraints; knowledge states;
the specific forms in which individuals define and pursue their self-interest; and the institutional forms
conditioning competitive market interactions; and the deterministic equilibrium states they define [8,9].
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While possibly useful as bases for pursuing thought exercises, these approaches face practical and
conceptual difficulties that are not widely acknowledged among economists.
The conceptual difficulties with the idea of seeking to understand economic systems on the basis of
an abstraction founded on a would-be “representative” individual have been well understood among
dissenting economists [10]. More general attempts to interpret what we can observe in economic
systems in relation to strongly specified descriptions of the intentions and actions of any number of
individuals also face great challenges.
The only setting in which the data we observe conceivably reflects the intentions of all individuals
is one in which our measurements are consistently taken from an economy in a state of deterministic
equilibrium in every market, at which all individual plans are not only formulated on the basis of
things we can observe, but are also being successfully implemented. However, we cannot expect to
observe real-world economies in such states of general equilibrium—both because adjustments to such
a state take time, and because the factors conditioning the characteristics of any would-be general
equilibrium are overwhelmingly likely to be changing faster than any such adjustment. We should
expect typically to observe individual outcomes at variance with individual plans [11].
More broadly, the individual characteristics and behaviors upon which individualist theorizations
are predicated are often unobservable and possibly unintelligible to observers [12], straining the
scientific soundness of suppositions made about their nature [13]. Even if it were somehow possible
to overcome these obstacles to develop observationally well-founded characterizations of individual
behavior, those would still not generally offer a robust basis to understand the macroscopic functioning
of economic systems. As well established across a variety of other disciplines, detailed descriptions of
individual behavior are generally impractical bases to investigate the functioning of large, complex
systems composed of many non-linearly coupled parts. Individual evolutions in such systems typically
trace chaotic, disequilibrium paths along which it is very difficult to relate what we can observe to
posited details of individual behavior.
Economic and social systems pose an additional and characteristic difficulty relative to physical
systems in this regard: all economically relevant features of individuals are themselves shaped by
economic competition and broader social interactions. It is not just that the rules of the economic
game are social, as Kenneth Arrow pointed out. The players themselves are social too: Individual
consumer preferences are shaped by the competitive interventions of enterprises [14]; economies
of scale, scope, and agglomeration ensure the productive capacities of firms reflect their history
of competitive interactions and geographical contexts [15]; and the manners in which individuals
define and choose to pursue their self-interest are notoriously shaped by a variety of social influences,
including fads, “herd behavior,” social power, etc. [16,17].
If the characteristics of economic individuals evolve as part of competitive market interactions,
taking them as an analytical starting point is not just impractical. It is an arbitrary parametrization
of the complex, dynamic functioning of a competitive, decentralized market economy. Arbitrary
because there should be no a priori reason to expect regularities or equilibria allowing us to characterize
the functioning of such economies to be defined by stability in micro-level details of individual
characteristics. Individualist parametrizations also have a conservative thrust, in the sense that they
focus analytical attention on the consequences of given differences in economic characteristics across
individuals, regions, or economies, with less emphasis on what are often the most interesting and
pressing questions of economic inquiry: the social and historical processes giving rise to those present
differences. This practice has a long pedigree in economic analysis, going back at least as far as David
Ricardo’s discussion of comparative advantage. That account motivates the benefits of trade on the
basis of a thought exercise where Portugal has a given comparative advantage in the production of
wine—a good whose production is most strongly influenced by inherent climatological characteristics
of a region—while England has a comparative advantage in the production of cloth—a good reflecting
a history of industrialization that paves the way for subsequent gains in labor productivity.
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Finally, the annual or quarterly frequencies at which we are typically able to observe some
elements of individual economic states are far lower than the frequencies at which individuals interact.
The quantities we can observe reflect not the behavior of individuals per se, but the accumulated,
reduced-form result of many interactions among large numbers of individuals. Between the times at
which we can take measurements, much of the information about the detail of individual behavior
has been lost—both as a result of large numbers of interactions, and of changes to the individuals
themselves. It is generally impossible in those cases to draw on observation to inform the kinds of
detailed, reductionist accounts sought by most economists.
Developing an observationally grounded understanding of the functioning of contemporary
economic systems requires grappling deliberately with these difficulties.
2.2. The Systemic, Social Content of What We Observe
Contributions from a diverse range of traditions in economics and political economy have shown
that reductions of observable economic outcomes to detailed descriptions of individual states and
actions are unnecessary and often misleading. Many of them have also effectively contended that
the observable regularities that enable economists to offer characterizations of the functioning of
decentralized, market economies are systemic and social. Those regularities are not generally defined
by the fine-grained detail of individual intentions and actions or by the equillibra those agencies may
condition. They reflect emergent outcomes of competitive interactions and interdependencies that
duly systemic theorizations of the social outcomes of market interactions may explain.
Observable economic outcomes may be robustly indifferent to much of the micro-level detail of
individual behavior [18]. Basic postulates of economic analysis can be explained as results of rather
simple propositions, without recourse to detailed descriptions of that behavior. The “law of demand”
can be understood to reflect simple budgetary constraints bearing on all consumers, and not
as a consequence of their “rational” optimizing behavior and of the transitivity, completeness,
and reflexivity of their preferences across available bundles of goods [19]. The observation that
factor shares in the output of enterprises typically add up to one can be understood to follow from
similar accounting facts, and not as validation of the theory of “perfect competition” and of the
presence of technological constraints generating constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production
functions [20].
Many important economic outcomes can also be understood as emergent results of competitive
interactions and structural interdependencies, and irreducible to the details of the intentions,
knowledge, and actions of any individual. This was first recognized by Adam Smith [21], who famously
noted that competition can ensure that the pursuit of pecuniary self interest unintentionally gives
rise to coordination across large numbers of economic individuals, and to a socially desirable push
toward improvements in the physical productivity of labor and in the social measure of prosperity.
There is considerable irony in the dominance of individualist reductionism in contemporary economics.
The early development of the discipline was motivated by the gradual recognition that societies
increasingly dependent on market interactions were subjected to influences beyond the control of
individuals and traditional institutions. It is thus no coincidence that the central, towering founding
figure of the discipline may have also been the first scholar in any field to write about what we now
term emergence.
Friedrich Hayek offered a more contemporary, radical-subjectivist elaboration of this view [22].
The knowledge necessary to achieve coordination and desirable social outcomes is dispersed, subjective
knowledge of localized conditions and profit opportunities. It cannot be acquired or even understood
by any single agent. It is competition between alert agents that ensures prices spontaneously come to
reflect the comparative social significance of all opportunities. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis can
be understood as an influential version of this view, applied to the content and evolution of observable
capital-market prices [23]. In both cases, market competition is understood to give rise to observable
price systems offering emergent, social quantifications of a broad range of detailed economic realities
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that no single agent may observe or characterize, including theorists of economic functioning. In both
cases, economic analysis actually results in strong statements concerning our ignorance about those
details and their future effects on prices [24].
Other traditions of economic thought also have emphasized how structural interdependences
and competitive interactions ensure that the observable regularities upon which we may base our
understanding of the functioning of economic systems reflect non-trivial, unintended, and at times
perverse effects of individual actions. Keynesian contributions have pointed to the evolution of
individual balance-sheet positions, which is shaped by the aggregate identity between incomes
and expenditures of all participants in an economy. The resulting interdependencies can condition
paradoxical results or fallacies of composition, such as the paradox of thrift and the paradox of debt [25,26].
Karl Marx identified another potential source for paradoxes and fallacies of composition in the
competitive pursuit of technical innovation: the dependence of market prices on average measures
of physical productivity across all suppliers in an industry [27]. A recent contribution has offered
a generalized version of this argument, suggesting that the observed outcomes of many complex
competitive interactions reflect a simple, emergent outcome: the social scaling of certain individual
characteristics by social or average measures of themselves across all competing individuals [28].
These and related contributions suggest that the things we can typically measure in economic
analysis are reduced-form outcomes of the complex, dynamic interplay between evolving individual
agents, competitive interactions, and structural interdependencies. Any regularities present in them
are most usefully understood as emergent, systemic or social outcomes of those processes. They require
and enable the formulation of systemic or social characterizations of the outcomes of competitive
functioning in decentralized, market economies. The development of those characterizations generally
requires careful consideration of what elements of individual agency, competitive interactions,
and structural interdependencies prove relevant to the determination of what we observe. There is no
justification for a prior commitment to theoretical accounts privileging only one of these interrelated
features of economic interactions as a methodological foundation.
The information theoretic indices and broader methodological approach offered below can help
the development of such characterizations. By so doing, they may also support the development
of new, observationally grounded political economies of the social content of contemporary
capitalist economies.
3. Drawing on Information Theory
Information Theory offers distinctively useful tools enabling formal inferences about complex
patterns of economic and social interaction based on their observable outcomes. This section
discusses two central information theoretic concepts that can help guide observational inquiry into
the associations between economic characteristics across large numbers of individuals: entropy and
mutual information.
3.1. The Formal Setting
To motivate their applicability for analysis of social systems, consider an economic or social
system as composed of a large number N of individual members. At any given point in time,
each of those members has an individual state defined over a set of v degrees of freedom,
Xv = { X0 , X1 , ..., Xv }. Individual degrees of freedom may describe quantifiable individual
characteristics, as well as macroscopic quantities that take the same value across a large number of
individuals in the system. They may also describe qualitative or categorical individual characteristics,
including descriptions of an individual’s institutional or relational situations. Coding schemes mapping
the latter characteristics onto distinct real numbers allow individual states to be represented by vectors
~xv = { x0 , x1 , ..., xv }, with the set of all such individual states denoted by T ⊆ Rv .
In all practical work the space T is effectively “coarse grained” into sv bins or effective individual
states. The phase space Ωv of this system can then be thought of as the set of all its possible micro-level
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configurations—all the svN arrangements of individual members of the system across the sv individual
states. Since Xv is an exhaustive description of all individual characteristics relevant to economic and
social interactions, the functioning of the system is entirely indifferent between individuals with the
same ~xv . What will matter is the total number of members or occupancy ni in each of the sv bins in
T. The macroscopic state of the system can be defined as a frequency function f (~xv ) describing the
normalized occupancy of each bin. The functioning of a system defines an (sv − 1)-dimensional space
Φv containing all macroscopic states f (~xv ) the system may occupy. The laws and regularities that
define a system are given statistical expression in the shape of Φv .
In observational, quantitative social inquiry we often face variations of the following analytical
problem within this setting: We can observe the values taken by w < v individual degrees of freedom
across n < N members of the system. This allows construction of frequency histograms f (~xw ) over
the values taken by the vector ~xw of observed individual states. We have limited knowledge of the
micro-level interactions driving the functioning of the system. In addition, we generally do not know
the full set Xv of relevant degrees of freedom. However, we would like to draw on what we observe
to infer as much as we can about the functioning of the social or economic system at hand. Formally,
we want to develop increasingly accurate descriptions of the shape of Φw ⊂ Φv .
3.2. Entropy and Mutual Information
In this connection the concept of entropy is distinctively useful. The entropy H (X) for any set
of degrees of freedom X in a system occupying a macroscopic state f (~x ), defined over s bins, can be
understood as an average, logarithmic measure of the number W f of micro-level configurations or
elements in the phase space Ω yielding the macroscopic state f (~x ) ∈ Φ. Formally,
H (X) =

s
log W f
1
N!
=
log s
≈ − ∑ f i log f i
N
N
∏i ni !
i =1

(1)

Note that this quantity can also be understood as a measure of the diversity or heterogeneity
in the values taken by X. If all individuals are in the same bin, Equation (1) ensures entropy
is zero. If individuals are evenly distributed across all s bins—a state of maximum diversity or
heterogeneity—entropy reaches its maximum value: log s. It should be obvious that a change in the
state of a single individual results in an increase in entropy if and only if the change takes that individual
to a state with lower occupancy than the state it originally occupied. That is, entropy increases only
when diversity or heterogeneity increases [29].
Entropy is useful in analysis of systems with large N >> m for at least two reasons. First, for those
systems the combinatorial dominance of the distribution f ∗ (~x ) achieving maximum entropy over all
other macroscopic states in Φ is overwhelming. This conclusion can guide the iterative process of
observational inquiry into the functioning of such systems. If we have a set of knowledge, beliefs,
or hypotheses G suggesting that the functioning of the system keeps it within a set ΦG of macroscopic
states, we should expect to observe macroscopic behavior in line with the state f ∗ (~x | G ) that maximizes
entropy over that set. This is the Principle of Maximum Entropy (PME).
It is important to note that the PME is not a behavioral hypothesis and is entirely independent of
the elements in set G. In fact, if we observe macroscopic behavior at variance with f ∗ (~x | G ), the PME
tells us that G is either incomplete or wrong, informing subsequent inquiry [30]. What the Principle
offers is a distinctive and logically robust way to link knowledge we may have about the micro-level
functioning of a system and what basic combinatorial considerations lead us to conclude about its
observable macroscopic states. This is a very different conceptualization of the relationship between
micro- and macro-level functioning than that which grounds most contemporary economic thinking.
A converse application of the PME is particularly useful in observational work in quantitative
social inquiry [29,31–36]. Sometimes we observe cross-sectional frequencies f (~xw ) that are persistently
and ubiquitously well described by known, closed-form functional forms. Those functional forms are
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often entropy maxima over sets Φw that are defined by known moment constraints on the distribution
of ~xw .
We may infer that those moment constraints offer good systemic descriptions of laws or
regularities present in the processes conditioning values of ~xw . Interactions involving all observed and
non-observed degrees of freedom in Xv yield outcomes in Φw that are aptly characterized by them.
Those constraints often provide important formal clues about the macroscopic or social content of the
micro-processes at hand, and can inform the development of empirically successful economic or social
theories [28,37,38].
Entropy is also useful in the more common settings where observed distributions are not well
described by known, closed-form functional forms. Entropy can be understood as a measure of the
uncertainty we have about the exact micro-level configuration of a system we observe at a given
macroscopic state. Depending on the base of the logarithm used in definition (1), entropy measures the
average number of bits, nats, or dits necessary to enumerate all micro-level configurations resulting in
that state.
This measure of uncertainty motivates the concept of mutual information. For two degrees of
freedom Xi and X j , it is defined by,




I Xi , X j = H ( Xi ) − H Xi | X j = H ( Xi ) − ∑ f x j H Xi | x j

(2)

xj

This is a quantification of the average reduction in our uncertainty about Xi when we observe
the distribution of X j : The change in the average number of bits, nats, or dits needed to enumerate
or identify uniquely each micro-level configuration compatible with observation when moving from
observing only Xi to observing Xi and X j . Mutual information can also be thought of as a measure of
the information shared between the two quantities, in that it quantifies how much we learn about one
of them from observation of the other.
4. Indices of Informational Association
The concepts of entropy and mutual information enable the development of non-parametric
characterizations of informational associations present in observed data generated by economic and
broader social interactions. Those can inform the development of systemic characterizations of the
functioning of economic systems. In line with that objective, this section develops a series of indices of
mutual, joint, and incremental or conditional mutual information between sets of individual degrees
of freedom. It derives versions of these indices that are useful for a common situation in social inquiry:
A setting where we are interested in the comparative influence of two sets of factors over a variable
of interest.
4.1. Multivariate Mutual and Joint Information
The multivariate generalization of mutual information requires careful consideration.

As motivated by canonical contributions to information theory, [39–41], note that I Xi , X j =

I ( Xi ) − I Xi | X j , where the self mutual information I (Y ) = H (Y ). By extension,
I ( X0 , X1 , X2 ) = I ( X0 , X1 ) − I ( X0 , X1 | X2 )

(3)

where the conditional or incremental mutual information I ( X0 , X1 | X2 ) = H ( X0 | X2 ) − H ( X0 | X1 , X2 )
measures the information gained about X0 upon observation of X1 when X2 is already known.
The tripartite mutual information in (3) is a measure of the information shared by all three variables:
the information shared by X0 and X1 , minus the part of that shared information not contained in X2 .
The general multivariate mutual information can be defined recursively,
I ( X0 , X1 , ..., Xk ) = I ( X0 , X1 , ..., Xk−1 ) − I ( X0 , X1 , ..., Xk−1 | Xk )

(4)
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The mutual information between all k + 1 variables measures the shared informational content of
the first k variables minus the part of that content not contained in Xk .
In inquiry into the functioning of economic and social systems, a different measure of
informational association is more directly and obviously useful. We are often interested in learning not
about the informational content shared among several variables but in how much of the uncertainty in
a single degree of freedom X0 is removed when we observe values taken by a set Xk = { X1 , ..., Xk }
of other degrees of freedom. Put differently, we are often interested in the informational account of X0
given jointly by the elements in Xk : How much do we know about individual values x0 taken by X0
based on knowledge or observation of χk = { x1 , ..., xk }.
This may come up as part of general inquiry into the dynamic co-determinations between all
these variables. It may also come up in settings where we know that the elements of a set Xk are prior
to the interactions generating values of all other degrees of freedom in a system, including X0 . In such
cases, the informational equivalence may be taken as a measure of the extent to which the elements in
Xk influence values of X0 , directly or indirectly through their influence on other degrees of freedom.
To characterize this kind of informational accounting, a measure of joint mutual information is
more useful [42–44]. Defining it first for a setting with three degrees of freedom, consider,
I ( X0 ; ( X1 , X2 )) = H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 | ( X1 , X2 ))

(5)

Which measures the reduction in uncertainty about values of X0 once values of X1 and X2 are
taken into account. The relationship between this measure and the conditional mutual information can
be easily established. Adding H ( X0 | X1 ) − H ( X0 | X1 ) = 0 to this definitions yields,
I ( X0 ; ( X1 , X2 )) = ( H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 | X1 )) + ( H ( X0 | X1 ) − H ( X0 | ( X1 , X2 )))

= I ( X0 , X1 ) + I ( X0 , X2 | X1 )

(6)

The joint mutual information between X0 and ( X1 , X2 ) is the sum of the mutual information
between X0 and X1 and a conditional or incremental mutual information—the information gained
about X0 upon observation of X2 when X1 is already known. This results in a measure of the total
reduction in uncertainty about X0 arising from joint observation of X1 and X2 .
The multivariate generalization of this measure for X0 and a set Xk of k other degrees of freedom
that may take individual values χk = { x1 , x2 , ..., xk } may also be defined recursively,
I ( X0 , Xk ) = H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 |Xk )

= ( H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 |Xk−1 )) + ( H ( X0 |Xk−1 ) − H ( X0 |Xk ))

(7)

= I ( X0 , Xk−1 ) + I ( X0 , Xk |Xk−1 )
4.2. A Useful Decomposition
While it is possible in principle to characterize measures of joint, mutual, and incremental
informational association between all possible groupings of elements in Xk and X0 , the resulting
decompositions are impractically cumbersome even for small k. Fortunately, in many applications in
economic and social inquiry, we are interested in a simpler decomposition: separating the variables in
Xk into two mutually exclusive sets, Xe containing e of the k individual degrees of freedom, and its
complement in Xk , Xi , containing the remaining i = k − e ones,
I ( X0 ; Xk ) = ( H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 |Xe )) + ( H ( X0 |Xe ) − H ( X0 |Xk ))

= I ( X0 ; Xe ) + I ( X0 ; Xi |Xe )
= I ( X0 ; Xi ) + I ( X0 ; Xe |Xi )

(8)
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The total, joint informational association of the degrees of freedom in Xk and the variable of
interest X0 is given by the joint mutual information between the latter and the variables in the set Xe
plus the incremental information gained about X0 upon observation of Xi when Xe is already known.
The symmetric decomposition is also valid, naturally.
Since the degrees of freedom in each two sets Xe and Xi are being considered jointly, it is also
possible to consider the tripartite mutual information,
I ( X0 , X e , X i ) = I ( X0 , X e ) − I ( X0 , X e | X i ) = I ( X0 , X e ) + I ( X0 , X i ) − I ( X0 , X k )

(9)

The joint mutual information in (8) can be decomposed into the two measures of conditional or
incremental mutual information defined by Xe and Xi and the mutual information between X0 and
the two sets.
I ( X0 ; Xk ) = I ( X0 ; Xe |Xi ) + I ( X0 ; Xi |Xe ) + I ( X0 , Xe , Xi )
(10)
The expressions of decompositions (8) and (10) as normalized indices of informational association
enable the pursuit of an innovative, systemic approach to observational, quantitative social inquiry.
4.3. Coefficients of Association and Informational Accounts
The joint mutual information between X0 and Xk measures the extent to which the former is
informationally equivalent to the latter. We may thus consider the informational account of X0 provided
by Xk . The measure of this joint mutual information normalized by the entropy of X0 offers a useful
measure of the success of this informational account,
A ( X0 ||Xk ) ≡

H ( X0 |Xk )
I ( X0 , X k )
= 1−
H ( X0 )
H ( X0 )

(11)

It should be obvious that A ( X0 ||Xk ) ∈ [0, 1], with A ( X0 ||Xk ) = 1 only when the account is
deterministic: There is no information about X0 outside of the set Xk . If we know all values χk
taken by Xk , we have exact knowledge of the individual values taken by x0 by all individuals in
the system. We may term a degree of freedom Xi in an account provided by Xk independent if

A Xi || X j = 0, ∀ X j ∈ Xk , j 6= i. An account may be termed orthogonal if all the degrees of freedom
involved are independent.
There should be no expectation that analysis of complex social systems can even approximately
result in accounts that are deterministic or orthogonal. The general expectation of orthogonality
in accounts of social phenomena is misguided and partly conditioned by confusion between
parametrizations as a thought exercise, and the practical possibility of exerting control over dynamically
interdependent quantities in complex social systems. There are simply too many interdependences
and informational interactions between the degrees of freedom involved at observable frequencies.
However, in social inquiry, we can often make some progress toward understanding the influences
on a degree of freedom X0 by considering measures of its incremental and mutual informational
association with two mutually exclusive subsets of Xk , Xe and Xi ,

IXe |Xi ≡

I ( X0 ; Xe |Xi )
I ( X0 ; Xi |Xe )
I ( X0 , X e , X i )
; IX i | X e ≡
; M ( X0 , X e , X i ) ≡
H ( X0 )
H ( X0 )
H ( X0 )

(12)

These conventions permit several different ways to express the decomposition of A ( X0 ||Xk ),
A ( X0 ||Xk ) = A ( X0 ||Xe ) + (1 − A ( X0 ||Xe )) A ( X0 |Xe ||Xi )

= A ( X0 ||Xe ) + IXi |Xe = A ( X0 ||Xi ) + IXe |Xi
= IXi |Xe + IXe |Xi + M ( X0 , Xe , Xi )

(13)
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The total proportional reduction in uncertainty about X0 can be divided into the coefficient of
unconditional informational association between X0 and one of the two sets of individual degrees of
freedom, and the coefficient of incremental informational association between X0 and the other set of
individual degrees of freedom. It can also be expressed as a sum of the two coefficients of incremental
informational association, minus the coefficient of mutual informational association between X0 , Xe ,
and Xi .
The magnitude and sign of M ( X0 , Xe , Xi ) reveal an important informational relationship between
these degrees of freedom. They quantify the redundancy or synergies in the informational association of
X0 with Xe and Xi .
Formally, the sets of degrees of freedom Xe and Xi exhibit a measure of redundancy in
an informational account of X0 when M ( X0 , Xe , Xi ) > 0, which requires that A ( X0 ||Xk ) > IXi |Xe +
IXe |Xi . There is information about X0 in Xe that is also shared by Xi , and vice versa.
The less immediately intuitive setting of informational synergies occurs when M ( X0 , Xe , Xi ) < 0,
which requires that IXi |Xe > A ( X0 ||Xi ), which also implies that IXe |Xi > A ( X0 ||Xe ). That is, there are
informational synergies between the two sets of degrees of freedom in an account of X0 whenever the
incremental information of each set of degrees of freedom Xe , Xi with X0 is greater than its respective
unconditional informational association with X0 . In those cases, knowledge of one set of degrees of
freedom reduces more uncertainty about X0 if the other degree of freedom is already known. There is
information about X0 in the combination of Xe and Xi that is not contained in either of those two sets
individually. The combination may be associated with further degrees of freedom associated with X0 .
5. Categorical Characteristics and Piecewise Decompositions
In analysis of economic and social systems we are often confronted with categorical individual
characteristics. In those cases, part-piecewise decompositions of the indices developed above can be
useful in inquiry into the emergent, social consequences of certain individual characteristics on specific
individual outcomes. This section develops such decompositions for coefficients of joint informational
association and for coefficients of mutual and incremental associations involving a variable of interest
and two sets of individual degrees of freedom.
5.1. Piecewise Joint Associations
Let Xk be a set of observable categorical individual degrees of freedom, divided as above into two
subsets Xe and Xi . Let X0 be a quantitative variable of interest. In this setting, it is possible to derive
the part-pointwise decomposition of the coefficient of informational association defined in (13) across
all individual values χk taken by Xk ,
A ( X0 ||Xk ) =

∑ f (χk ) a (Y ||χk ) ; a (X0 ||χk ) ≡
χk

H ( X0 ) − H ( X0 | χ k )
H ( X0 )

(14)

The coefficients of joint pointwise informational association a ( X0 ||χk ) measure the proportional
reduction in heterogeneity or observer uncertainty about X0 once it is verified that Xk = χk .
It is important to note that (14) ensures that the overall informational association of a set of
degrees of freedom Xk and X0 may be due to very different informational associations between X0
and sub-populations χk . In fact, while A ( X0 ||Xk ) is always non-negative, values of a ( X0 ||χk ) may be
negative. This occurs when the distribution of X0 across all members of a χk sub-population has greater
heterogeneity than the distribution across the population as a whole. In those cases, the measures in
Xk have a greater informational influence on X0 within sub-populations with Xk 6= χk than on incomes
for individuals with χk characteristics. Put differently, factors other than those contained in or associated
with Xk have a greater informational role in shaping the heterogeneity of X0 within sub-population χk
than within the population as a whole.
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In general, observed differences in measures of a ( X0 ||χk ) across different χk sub-populations are
very significant in large-N systems. They strongly suggest that the processes determining individual
values of X0 across those sub-populations are formally different.
To see this, consider two such sub-populations χk = α, β, with Nα and Nβ members, and observed
piecewise coefficients of association a ( X0 || β) − a ( X0 ||α) = ∆ > 0. The ratio R of the statistical weight
β
Wβ of all arrangements of Nβ individuals across all possible levels of X0 resulting in the observed
distribution X0 | β, and the statistical weight Wβα of all arrangements of those Nβ individuals across
all possible levels of X0 resulting in a distribution, such as that observed for X0 |α is asymptotically
given by,
β
Wβ

(15)
R = α ∼ exp − Nβ H ( X0 ) ∆
Wβ
For large Nβ this ratio is vanishingly small. If the processes determining values of X0 in
sub-population β allowed for outcomes corresponding to a distribution, such as the one observed
for X0 |α, the likelihood we would instead observe the distribution we observe for X0 | β would be
practically zero. Repeated observation of ∆ > 0 leads us reasonably to conclude that those processes
simply do not permit sub-population β from reaching the same distribution of X0 as sub-population α.
5.2. Piecewise Decompositions for Two Sets of Characteristics
The coefficients inside the sum in (14) can be expressed in relation to two sets of individual
degrees of freedom or characteristics as above. Denoting those sets by Xe and Xi this may be formally
expressed as,
a ( X0 ||χk ) = a ( X0 ||χe ) + Iχi |χe = a ( X0 ||χi ) + Iχe |χi
(16)
= I χ i | χ e + I χ e | χ i + m ( X0 , χ e , χ i )
where Im|l and m ( X0 , m, l ) are part-pointwise versions of the coefficients of incremental association
defined in (12). The relationship between the part-pointwise coefficient of mutual association and its
population-wide version follows trivially,

M ( X0 , X e , X i ) =

∑

f ( χ e , χ i ) m ( X0 , χ e , χ i )

χe ,χi

where,

(17)

m ( X0 , χe , χi ) = a ( X0 ||χe ) − Iχe |χi = a ( X0 ||χi ) − Iχi |χe

= a ( X0 ||χe ) + a ( X0 ||χi ) − a ( X0 ||χk )
This coefficient reflects an important aspect of the informational association between X0 and pairs
χk = (χe , χi ) of individual characteristics. As with the population coefficient of mutual information,
any pair with m ( X0 , χe , χi ) < 0 can be understood to have a pointwise “synergistic” informational
association with X0 . For such pairs, their incremental informational association coefficients, Iχe |χi , Iχe |χi
are greater than their respective unconditional coefficients of informational association, a ( X0 ||χe ),
a ( X0 ||χi ). Equivalently, their joint coefficient of informational association with X0 is greater than the
sum of their respective coefficients of informational association with X0 . There is information about
individual income in the combination of characteristics (χe , χi ) that is not contained in either of those
characteristics by themselves. Conversely, characteristic pairs (χe , χi ) for which m ( X0 , χe , χi ) > 0 have
measures of redundancy in their informational association with Y. Please note that pairs (χe , χi ) can
be redundant or synergistic even when the sets Xe and Xi are synergetic or redundant, respectively.
The piecewise mutual information coefficient has a more general interpretation and significance.
It can also be understood as a negative comparative measure of informational association between
a set of characteristics χe and X0 for a subpopulation χi = α, relative to the overall informational
association between χe and X0 for the entire population: m ( X0 , χe , α) = a ( X0 ||χe ) − Iχe |α . It may thus
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be taken as a (negative) measure of the comparative informational association of characteristics χe and
X0 across different χi sub-populations.
6. Application to Income and Social Identity
Indices of joint, mutual, and incremental informational association can be widely applied across
different fields of social inquiry. For instance, they suggest a new methodological approach to debates
concerning the possible independent influence of capital-market prices on the levels of investment
undertaken by corporations [45–47]. It may also offer new ways to approach important questions such
as disparities in criminal sentencing across race [48], or estimation of the independent added-value of
education at elite educational institutions that recruit from very specific populations [49].
Here we briefly illustrate the use, novelty, and analytical power of these indices with an application
to a burning question of political economy: The persistent economic effects of discrimination by gender,
race, ethnicity, and other elements of social identity.
A large literature has provided evidence of the negative effects different forms of discrimination
have on the incomes of members of certain social-identity groups [50–55]. One of the difficulties in
grappling with the economic content and measure of those effects stems from the sheer complexity
of the interrelationships involved in the determination of individual levels of income. Observable
labor-market outcomes reflect the dynamic accumulation of educational, personal, and professional
outcomes along an individual’s life [56–59]. The mechanisms and interactions linking any given
observable individual characteristic and income are manifold, path-dependent, and very often
unobservable. This includes the influence of discriminatory treatment, biases, and stereotypes in
conditioning outcomes at all stages of those processes [60–69].
The complexity of the relationships involved create unsurmountable problems for statistical
tests for discrimination in economic outcomes based on estimation of linear regression models [1].
Those tests effectively consider a joint hypothesis: The presence of an independent influence of
identity on income and the specification of the model of the determination of wage income being used.
The accuracy of the postulated tests for the presence of the former effect hinges entirely on the validity
of the latter. Practical difficulties of estimation due to the omission of variables and other specification
errors, multicollinearity, endogeneity among regressors, etc. seriously limit the usefulness of those
diagnostic tests.
Indices of informational association fare much better. They offer simple, non-parametric ways
to characterize the reduced-form associations between economic characteristics, social identity,
and income. Since social identity is generally prior to the interactions involved in the determination
of income, its associations with other degrees of freedom can be understood as measures of its total,
direct and indirect influence over them. We can estimate their measure even without knowledge of the
particular mechanisms or the full set of observed and unobserved degrees of freedom involved.
Large-scale data on individual incomes and categorical measures of social identity, age group,
and level of educational attainment gathered in the decennial U.S. Census allows estimation of those
indices and measurement of these influences. Those estimates cast new light onto the very nature of
economic discrimination.
Before turning to this evidence it is useful to situate the application of indices of informational
association to the study of income distributions in relation to existing uses of entropy to characterize
inequality in income distributions, and to debates concerning equality of opportunity in economic
systems. In both counts the approach developed above enables original contributions.
6.1. Inequality Indices, Identity, and Equality of Opportunity
In considering indices of informational association between incomes and two sets of categorical
variables, we are effectively comparing the entropy of income distributions across sub-populations
defined by those variables. This reveals both the close relationship and the important difference
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between these indices, when applied to patterns of income, and the entropy-based index of income
inequality proposed by Henri Theil [2].
Theil’s index is defined for a population with i = 1, ..., N members, each of which has a share in
total income of yi ,
N

T = log N + ∑ yi log yi

(18)

i =1

This index is well known to possess the requisite properties of an inequality measure, including
obeying the Pigou-Dalton principle and exhibiting sub-group decomposability.
The entropy measure in Equation (1) applied to distributions of income over any given
sub-population is different from this index. It is defined as a sum not over individuals but over
coarse-grained income levels. This does not result in a measure of income inequality. It does
not generally follow the Pigou-Dalton principle, doing so only for income distributions that are
monotonically decreasing on income, and does not exhibit sub-group decomposability.
However, it is a sound measure of heterogeneity or uncertainty [29]. Most importantly, differences
in its value across sub-populations allow informational characterizations of associations between
income and other quantities established by the functioning of the economic system in question.
This enables inferences about the functioning of an economic system and the processes conditioning
levels of individual income.
Measures of informational association between individual characteristics and income also offer
an innovative empirical diagnostic for the presence of equality of opportunities across different groups in
a decentralized market economy.
Social-identity characteristics are a distinctive type of “circumstantial” or “arbitrary” factor
that according to contemporary proponents of “equality of opportunity” should not affect income
distributions: They are logically and almost always temporally prior to the processes determining
an individual’s economic characteristics and their income. Race and ethnicity groupings are social
creations with no biological foundation. The genetic variability across the different sets of human
populations that constitute various racial and ethnic categories are very small compared to the overall
genetic variability across humanity as a whole [70,71]. Any observed differences in patterns of
economic behavior and characteristics by those categories are social constructions.
Sex is obviously a biological category, and there may well be economic characteristics and
behaviors that are irreducibly sex-dysmorphic, that is, not the product of social processes of
conventions [66]. The lack of counterfactual evidence prevents serious investigation of this strong
claim. However, the economic consequences of any inherent sex-dysmorphic economic behavior or
characteristics are expressions of gender, and reflect how a society attaches significance and economic
value to that behavior and any other characteristics deemed “feminine” [72]. There is no a priori,
biological justification for allocating the social product in ways that systematically disadvantage more
than half of any society.
If an element of social identity is informative, we can conclude that it is influencing the social
processes shaping individual economic characteristics, and the processes establishing incomes on the
bases of those characteristics. These influences ensure some groups enjoy a narrower range of effective
opportunities and, thus, incomes than others. That narrowing is a form of discrimination, effected by
socio-economic processes, conventions, and institutions that systematically treat individuals differently
on the basis of their social identity.
6.2. Data and Observation
We considered four waves of the U.S. Census data, from 1970 to 2000, as well as the 2007–2011
pooled American Community Survey, extracted from [73]. These surveys provide the most
comprehensive and nationally representative source of data for income estimates across various
subpopulations in the United States. For each respondent reporting market income, we observe
their annual wage Y, and a set of two categorical economic characteristics χe : age and level of
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educational attainment. We construct age-group information by decade, and four distinct levels of
educational attainment. We also observe two social-identity characteristics, gender and race/ethnicity.
We considered the two reported genders and three race/ethnicity categories: white, black, and Hispanic.
All of the association indices above were estimated across all subgroups for each of the four decennial
samples. The Appendix A describes the construction of our sample in detail.
There is considerable variation in the distributions of income across sub-populations defined by
Xe and Xi . While a full account of those differences and their implications for our understanding of
economic discrimination is provided elsewhere, [1] two persistent patterns in the data clearly stand out.
First, the informational associations between social identities and incomes within each
educational-achievement group, formally given by Iχi |χe , exhibit a persistent and telling pattern.
As shown in Figure 1, men persistently enjoy negative measures of informativeness for their
gender, while women enjoy positive ones. Along similar lines, whites enjoy negative measures of
informativeness for their race/ethnicity, while blacks and hispanics enjoy positive ones (the incremental
information index for being white among college-educated individuals is only weakly negative in
part because whites make up the overwhelming majority of college educated individuals—86 percent
of the total in our sample in 2010. In this setting, the positive values for non-white sub-populations
capture the difference we are motivating almost entirely).
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Figure 1. Incremental Informational Association of Gender and Race/Ethnicity Characteristics for
given Levels of Educational Attainment. 1970–2010 Census and ACS data.
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This implies we actually gain uncertainty about individual income when we learn that somebody
is white or male. As groups, whites and men enjoy greater opportunities for income differentiation by
characteristics other than their identity and observed level of educational attainment than everybody
else. Women, blacks, and hispanics do not enjoy the same opportunities for potentially meritocratic
differentiation. Their identities are associated with a wide variety of unobservable processes that
effectively concentrate their realized market incomes, around values that are known to be lower
than those enjoyed by men and whites. As shown in Figure 2, a similar pattern is observed across
age groups.
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Figure 2. Incremental Informational Association of Gender and Race/Ethnicity Characteristics,
given Age. 1970–2010 Census and ACS data.

These observed patterns are features of systems of discrimination that are irreducible to any
individual mechanism, agency, or relationship. Yet they distinctively show how distributions of
realized individual market incomes embody the very essence of pre-judice: The comparatively stronger
extent to which some individuals are in effect treated “by the color of their skin,” (as well as gender,
ethnicity, immigration status, etc.) instead of “by the content of their character” (as put by Martin
Luther King, Jr. in his I Have a Dream speech of 28 August 1963).
The second feature involves estimated indices of piecewise mutual information
m ( X0 , χe , χi ) = a ( X0 ||χe ) − Iχe |χi . As discussed above, those piecewise indices can be understood as
comparative measures across social-identity groups of the informational association a set of economic

Entropy 2019, 21, 367

16 of 20

characteristics χe has with income. Their values for each sub-population (χe , χi ) are shown in Figure 3,
which relates them to the average income Ȳe,i for that group measured relative to the average income
across all observed individuals, Ȳ¯ . We denote that relative measure of average group income by Se,i .
Black Women

Hispanic Women

White Women

1.6

1.2

Seduc, ident

0.8
● ●

0.4

●

● ●

●

Black Men

●●

●

●●

Hispanic Men

●

White Men

1.6

1.2
●
●

●

●

0.8

●
●
●

●

●

●
●
●

0.4
−0.05

0.00

0.05

−0.05

0.00

0.05

−0.05

0.00

0.05

M(Y,educ,ident)
●

●

Less than HS

1980

●

1990

HS Graduate

●

2000

●

2010

Some College

College Grad

Figure 3. Mutual information between income, education, and identity, and relative average income of
education level in question. 1980–2010 Census and ACS data.

The figure conveys several well-understood features, iniquities, and developments in the
distribution of income in the U.S. over the past four decades. One set of related features is
particularly striking.
The curves for all groups of women have a distinctive “tilt,” ensuring they are almost always
upward sloping in the plotted space. They exhibit lower measures of m (Y, χe , χi ) for low levels
of education, which correspond to low average levels of pay. There is a comparatively strong
relative incremental informational association between their low levels of education and their incomes.
In contrast, all groups of women have higher measures for m (Y, χe , χi ) for high levels of education and
pay. They enjoy comparatively weak incremental informational associations between their high levels
of education and their incomes. Put differently, their educational level becomes a comparatively weaker
informational predictor of their incomes as the level of education rises. It is a stronger informational
predictor as it falls. In contrast, the curves for white men have a clear negative “tilt.” As their
educational attainment levels increase, educational achievement becomes a comparatively stronger
informational predictor of their incomes.
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At the broadest level, these observations strongly suggest that social patterns of discrimination
ensure the returns on educational achievement are very unevenly distributed across social-identity
groups. Members of some groups are effectively punished more harshly than others for their low levels
of education, while members of other groups are effectively rewarded more generously for their high
levels of education. This has important implications for our understanding of the possibilities and limits
of individual and social interventions seeking to reduce the economic consequences of discrimination.
7. Conclusions
This paper was motivated by a critical appreciation of the conceptual and practical problems faced
by observational work founded on the strong form of individualist reductionism dominating current
economic thought. The ordinary and piecewise informational indices it developed offer an innovative
way to guide robust observational inquiry into reduced-form, systemic associations between a variable
of interest and two sets of covariates in economic and broader social systems.
Their application to U.S. data on income, economic, and social-identity characteristics yields
robust, observationally grounded insights into the economic effects and challenges posed by systems
of discrimination in that economy. It also illustrated how information theory offers a natural language
to express and investigate realities of social discrimination, which ensure elements of social identity
are informative of observable economic outcomes.
We believe further work developing and applying indices of information association can make
an important instrumental contribution to the development of observationally grounded insights into
the functioning of complex economic and broader social systems.
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Appendix A. Data Source and Sample Sizes
The data for this study are drawn from the US decennial census in the years 1970–2000. After 2000,
the Census Bureau replaced the more detailed “long” census form (which contains income questions
inter-alia) with an annual nationally representative survey, the American Community Survey (ACS).
We use the pooled ACS data from 2007-2011, but refer to it as the 2010 census for simplicity. For full
details of the construction of the variables reported above, see [1].
The census data sets used in this study are 1% or 5% samples of the national
population. Table A1 shows the sample sizes for calculations involving both social identity and
educational achievement.
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Table A1. Sample sizes, by year, social identity and educational achievement group. Census and
ACS data.
Year
1970
1970
L1970
1970
1970
1970
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Identity
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women

Less than HS
47,597
37,740
19,538
11,108
261,573
154,769
88,590
71,874
76,963
47,700
451,383
296,628
49,054
41,797
97,168
56,353
275,601
184,978
37,835
37,379
152,599
81,853
196,825
131,188
24,582
24,699
135,238
74,481
121,329
76,263

HS Graduate
20,317
23,659
7868
6833
248,456
231,591
82,399
95,486
43,020
40,274
804,133
792,951
92,850
102,665
71,513
60,227
794,572
766,198
135,743
158,380
142,383
115,708
978,455
900,990
118,256
130,839
167,596
132,403
893,388
779,487

Some College
6019
6744
3279
2180
106,876
78,829
40,975
49,931
24,223
19,368
417,535
366,706
61,153
88,411
50,378
49,585
668,303
692,206
66,406
97,717
58,402
60,884
L555,043
585,423
72,780
112,855
82,872
92,845
591,341
652,105

College Grad
3308
4654
2067
1081
96,718
58,314
20,711
26,944
12,643
8566
424,329
288,578
26,591
38,923
20,206
18,198
526,815
462,415
40,522
61,822
33,944
35,562
615,719
618,360
51,198
85,907
55,484
67,616
744,587
830,034

Total
77,241
72,797
32,752
21,202
713,623
523,503
232,675
244,235
156,849
115,908
2,097,380
1,744,863
229,648
271,796
239,265
184,363
2,265,291
2,105,797
280,506
355,298
387,328
294,007
2,346,042
2,235,961
266,816
354,300
441,190
367,345
2,350,645
2,337,889
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